Montague grammarians cl^T" that tlic logical analysis 01 language skccdicd in standard textbooks of first order logic is too coarse to be appropriate to such natural languages as English. In the following we shall defend the opposite view-at least as far as a very narrow fragment of English is concerned, traditional logical analysis is perfectly adequate provided we are ready to pay the price of abandoning classical logic in favour of logics containing a sufficiently rich stock of logical constants. Within the framework of Casari's comparative logic, we shall outline a model of a restricted fragment of English. We shall address such issues as the construction of complex noun phrases, the distinction between gradable and vague adjectives, the structure of comparative sentences and of antonym adjectival pairs.
INTRODUCTION
Montague grammar (Montague 1974, especially 188-270) is generally regarded as a considerable refinement of the traditional logical analysis of natural languages, as usually outlined in the first chapters of any textbook of elementary logic This is of course true. The orthodox analysis works fine for simple and mostly ad hoc examples, but breaks down as soon as slightly more complicated constructions are examined. Think of adjectives like big, wide, good, etc According to Reichenbach (1947) , an advocate of the traditional view, complex noun phrases consisting of an adjective in prenominal position and a common noun can be given a conjunctive reading.
(1) and (2) below, for example, are equivalent:
(1) Horses are four-legged animals; (2) Horses are four-legged and horses are animals.
But this is no longer the case with the forementioned adjectives, sometimes called relative (in contrast -with, four-legged and the like, termed absolute) since they involve a 'reference class'. (3) and (4) are by no means equivalent:
(3) Dumbo is a small elephant; (4) Dumbo is small and Dumbo is an elephant Montague concludes that adjectives cannot be treated as ordinary predicates. For traditional logic, adjectives, intransitive verbs and common nouns are nothing but one-place predicates. According to Montague, however, they fall under three distinct syntactic categories. In particular, adjectives are syntactical operators mapping noun phrases to other noun phrases; semanticaUy, they correspond to functions from properties to properties (properties, in turn, are sets of individual concepts, Le. sets of functions from possible worlds to individuals).
Is this multiplication of categories praeter necessitatem? It would be nice if we could prove that it is. In what follows, we shall endorse a 'generalized conjunctive reading' of such sentences as (3) above. For this purpose, we shall introduce a noncommutative conjunction A * B, to be read approximately as 'A, taking into account that B\ This connective will be shown to have a rather natural algebraic interpretation.
Comparative sentences are considered as yet another shortcoming of the received view. Given the sentence a is more P than b, traditional logic regards 'is more P than' as a standard two-place predicate, Le. it leaves it unanalysed. Several theories, which we shall review below, have been proposed to amend this apparent flaw, each one of them considerably enlarging the logical apparatus of first order theories or their ontological background. Here we shall suggest an 'implicative reading' of comparative sentences, involving nothing else than standard predicates (corresponding to positive adjectives) and. a nonstandard implication connective.
Generally speaking, we shall try to account for the above-mentioned natural language constructions not by increasing the number of the ordinary categories of logical morphology and syntax, but by proceeding to a more fine-grained investigation of prepositional connection. In order to save classical logical analysis, we shall give up classical logic and adopt a different framework, based on Casari's comparative logic (Casari 1987 (Casari , 1989 (Casari , 1990 (Casari , 1997 .
It must be emphasized that the primary focus of the present proposal is on suggesting a new field of application for comparative logic, rather than on providing new insights into the semantical structure of adjectives and comparison in natural language. Hence, we shall be rather selective in the choice of the examined natural language constructions (see, however, section 6 for a broader discussion).
The formal build-up of the corresponding model will only be outlined. In section 2, we shall briefly "review the main rival theories of adjectives. In section 3 we shall do the same for theories of comparison. In section 4 we shall discuss the philosophical basis of comparative logic, focusing on its application to the reconstruction of comparative sentences and complex noun phrases. In section $ we shall sketch a formal model, and in section 6 we shall point out some limits of our investigations.
ADJECTIVES: THE ATTRIBUTIVE AND THE PREDICATIVE APPROACH
Most adjectives have in English both attributive (prenominal) and predicative occurrences, although a few only occur either as attributives (e.g. former) or as predicates (e.g. asleep) . Does this syntactic dichotomy show up even on the semantic level? A number of authors who share this opinion (like Siegel 1979) postulate indeed two different semantic classes, attributive adjectives and predicative adjectives. However, if this were correct, the same adjective, e.g. good, should belong to different classes according to circumstances. Hence, most writers agree that a more uniform treatment is needed. There are two main families of uniform semantic theories of adjectives: attributive theories suggest that even syntactically predicative occurrences of a given adjective can be treated as semantic attributives, whereas predicative theories lay the opposite claim.
Attributive theories
Attributive theories (Parsons 1972; Montague 19744 Cresswell 1976; Hoepelman 1986 ) are sometimes also called NM-iheories ('NM' stands for 'noun modifier*). The best-known theory in this group is Montague's.
As already remarked, Montague handles adjectives as operators transforming noun phrases into other noun phrases. Although all kinds of adjectives admit of such a treatment, absolute adjectives have strong invariance properties and therefore resemble in their behaviour the ordinary predicates of logic Montague accounts for the predicative use of adjectives introducing a dummy noun ('entity"). (5) and (6) are thus claimed to be equivalent (5) This is red; (6) This is a red entity.
Other forms of deletion are sometimes invoked. Keenan & Faltz (1985) , for example, translate (5) as: There is a property Q such that This is a red Q is true.
Hoepelman (1986) provides a somewhat different account Adjectives are viewed as functions whose domain and range is the powerset of the universe of discourse. For example, £TALL(MAN) gives the set of tall men, £TAII.(TALL MAN) yields the set of very tall men. Common nouns are themselves functions with the same domain and range. There is a single basic predicate, T ('thing'); the remaining predicates result from the inductive application of common nouns to other predicates.
Here are some objections usually raised against attributive theories:
A) Unsatisfactory analysis of comparatives (Kamp 197$). We shall return later on such an issue.
B) Problems in deriving the reference class for predicative occurrences (Hamann 1991). Deletion of a dummy noun does not properly explain the predicative use of adjectives. Probably, John is tall does not mean that John is tall as an entity, but that John is tall as a man. Some NM-theorists retort that the proper reference class is supplied by the grammatical subject of the sentence, but this does not work either. Take the following example:
(7) The cathedral tower is high compared to the surrounding buildings.
In such a case, we should have two distinct and incompatible reference classes.
C) Problems in deriving the reference class for attributive occurrences (Beesley 1982)
. According to attributive theories, the reference class of an attributive should invariably be given by its argument, Le. the noun it is attached to. However, suppose you hear the following exchange at a cocktail party:
(8) "Who is Quang?' 'Quang is the short Vietnamese*.
In such a circumstance, probably, short means 'short for a man'.
D) Lack of uniformity (Beesley 1982). Treating adjectives as functions,
Montague cannot even show that A red bam is red is a valid sentence. To make up for this, he is forced to introduce appropriate meaning postulates, splitting up the class of adjectives according to three distinct inference patterns. So, his theory is only seemingly uniform.
E) Problems with composition (Siegel 1979). If adjectives are functions, it
should be possible to compose them unambiguously. However, John is a tall old man has two different readings (John is tall for an old man'; John is both tall and old for a man').
Predicative theories
According to predicative theories, also known as In what follows, we shall try to plead the cause of the predicative approach by trying to show that complex noun phrases involving relative adjectives (at least when dimension adjectives such as tall or big are at issue) can actually be given a 'conjunctive' reading, though in i. rather peculiar sense (remark that also Beesley 1982, although from a completely different standpoint, advocated the feasibility of a conjunctive reading).
NM-theories, P-theories and adjective degrees
All of us learned in grammar books that descriptive adjectives have three degrees: positive, comparative and superlative. Leaving aside the superlative, one could wonder which of the remaining two degrees is logically prior to the other. It turns out that most partisans of the attributive approach agree on the logical priority of the comparative-or at least claim that both forms derive from a third, more basic, structure-whereas most predicative theorists embrace the opposite view.
According to the proponents of the first alternative (Langford 1942 . If we define a is P as a is Per than most, we get some counterexamples. If a large natural number were a natural number larger than most natural numbers, there would be no such number. Moreover, we can consistently suppose that John is the only driver around and a good one as welL According to the previous definition, however, he could not be such. Lastly, someone who is crazier than most people might be just a bit odd, not really crazy.
In the following, we shall try to defend the plausibility of the view according to which the positive degree is logically prior to the comparative. Indeed, we shall entirely resolve comparative constructions in terms of the corresponding positive adjectives and the propositional connectives.
Qradability and vagueness
Before moving on to the issue of comparison, let us briefly consider the distinction between gradability and vagueness. Relative adjectives, most typically dimension adjectives such as big or wide, are susceptible of being graded, Le. they come in degrees. At a first sight, this might seem to mean that they are vague. Upon a closer look, however, profound differences emerge between the two notions. We shall not address, except for some casually scattered remarks, the thorny philosophical issues concerning vagueness (the most exhaustive source of information on the topic is Williamson 1994), confining ourselves to some purely linguistical observations.
It is generally agreed that the distinctive marks of gridable adjectives are that a) they can occur in predicative position after copular verbs; b) they can be preceded by degree modifiers (rather, very, etc: Klein 1980) ; c) they are order inducing (Klein 1991) ; d) they possess a comparative (Hoepelman 1986; Hamann 1991) . Vague adjectives, on the other hand, typically occur in antonym pairs sharing a basic quality (tall-short, big-small, etc.) , which cannot be used to partition their domain of application for they admit of extension gaps (for instance, some individuals may be neither tall nor short). If, following Hamann (1991), we-call '+pole' the adjective asserting that the common basic quality holds and '-pole' the adjective asserting that the common quality does not hold, we have:
but not the converse implications, holding instead for sharp adjectives. Bierwisch (1989) remarks that gradability implies vagueness, but not conversely. Value adjectives, indeed, admit of extension gaps but only become gradable once referred to a suitable comparison class. Williamson (1994) argues that gradability does not imply vagueness either. Acute and obtuse, taken as adjectives expressing properties of angles, have no extension gap (if we agree to include right angles in either class) and are separated by a definite cut-off point, but it is certainly correct to say that a 30 0 angle is more acute than a 6o° one. Engel (1989) makes a similar point for acid and basic as expressing properties of chemical compounds.
In our theory we shall not be concerned with value adjectives. Within our model, then, vagueness will imply gradability but the converse will not hold. Semantically speaking, gradable and vague adjectives will correspond to functions having different ranges.
THEORIES OF COMPARISON
Before going on to examine the main rival theories of comparison, let us circumscribe our topic We shall not discuss, in the following, some important kinds of comparative expressions, including comparatives in opaque contexts (like Russell's well-known / thought your yacht was longer than it is), differential comparatives (John is 3 cm taller than Bill), comparatives with negative polarity items (Cindy is more beautiful than anyone here) or nominal comparatives (John ate more apples than oranges), confining ourselves to ordinary adjectival comparatives. We shall, however, briefly return to some of these issues in the final section, where we shall try to discuss what further developments would be needed to improve our theory.
Supervaluational theories
Van Fraassen's method of supervaluations, originally devised to tackle problems related to free logics, was simultaneously adopted in the mid1970s by Fine (1975) and Kamp (1975) in order to give an account of the phenomena, respectively, of vagueness and comparison.
The theoretical core of this approach is the rejection of bivalence. Vague predicates, resp. dimension and value adjectives, imply the existence of extension gaps in correspondence of borderline cases. When I evaluate a sentence like a is P, the outcome can be either one of the two classical truth values (T or F), or a third value, N, to be assigned whenever the meaning of a falls in the extension gap of the meaning of P. A valuation of a given language, therefore, is a mapping of its propositions to the set {T, N, F}. Among all valuations, we can select those whose range is {T, F}-we agree to call them classical.
The completion of a valuation v is a classical valuation v* preserving the classical truth values already assigned by v: Le. if v(A) = T(F), then v*(A) = T(F). A proposition of such a language is supertrue iff, for every valuation v, v*(A) = T for every completion v* of v.
Intuitively, a completion of a valuation can be seen as a contextdependent parameter rendering perfectly precise such distinctions as, for example, the one between old and young. Think, for example, of a competition where a minimal (or maximal) age limit is set for participation.
The application to comparatives, due to Kamp, is nearly straightforward: a is at least as P as b (more P than b) is true in the valuation v iff the set of completions of v where b is P is (properly) included in the set of completions of v where a is P. So, John is taller than Bill iff there is a context-dependent parameter according to which John is tall and Bill is not. 
E) Mixed comparatives (Kamp 1975; von Stechow 1984). Kamp concedes that such sentences as: (14) Jones is more intelligent than he is kind
are 'considerably more difficult to treat . .. Their analysis requires more mathematical structure than has been built into the models here considered.' But mixed comparatives often occur in everyday language and should be accounted for. 
The semantics of degree
Among the best-known alternatives to Kamp's model of comparatives there is undoubtedly CresswelTs (1976) semantics of degree. The underlying idea is simple. As dimension and value adjectives typically come in degrees, to compare the Pness of a and b is to compare the degree to which a is P with the degree to which b is P.
More precisely, a degree is a pair (u, <), where < is a partial order relation and u belongs to its field. Basic sentences are of the form a is P to degree (u, <), whence the semantics of the positive can be extracted as shown in section 2.3 above. Comparison is only allowed between degrees of the same scale, Le. the partial order relation must be identical in both cases. So, if a is P to degree (u, <) and b is P to degree (v, <), then a is more P than b is true iff v < u.
To accommodate in his theory multidimensional adjectives (clever and the like), which usually do not have a naturally associated metric, Cresswell must however define degrees of P-ness as equivalence classes modulo the relation induced by the comparative of equality associated with P.
Some writers have highlighted the following flaws of Cresswell's semantics of degree:
A) Circularity (Klein 1980 ). Cresswell's theory is circular because comparatives are defined in terms of degrees, and degrees are in turn defined as equivalence classes modulo the relation induced by the comparative of equality. Moreover, it is counterintuitive: to compare Bill's and Tom's tallness-an extremely simple task-we should involve in the comparison all the individuals belonging to their equivalence classes.
B) Separate scales (Hamann 1991). According to Hamann:
Cresswell builds up a separate scale for each adjective-noun combination, so that the scales for tall man, tall boy etc are not the same. One expects, however, that for dimension adjectives the scale remains constant and only the norm varies with the comparison class. (Keenan & Faltz 198 s) . If John and Bill are both definitely short, it might be sensible to maintain that they are tall to degree zero, hence exactly as tall as each other according to CresswelL Yet John might be taller than BilL D) Mixed comparatives (Cresswell 1976; von Stechow, 1984) . Mixed comparatives are acceptable in Cresswell's theory only in so far as the adjectives involved share the same degree scale (e.g. tall and lon£j. A sentence such as (14) above would count as meaningless. However, Hamann et al. (1980) have tried to amend the semantics of Cresswell in order to accommodate mixed comparatives. (Cresswell 1976) . Cresswell asserts that 'on the semantics given for er than, it is not possible to have degrees of "tallerthan-ness"'. Hence nested comparisons are not feasible.
C) Non-borderline comparatives

E) Nested comparatives
Many-valued and fuzzy approaches
The employment of many-valued and fuzzy logics permits an analysis of comparatives in terms of prepositional connection (Goguen 1969; Lakoff 1975)- If supervaluationists had raised to three the number of truth values, many-valued logicians are far more liberal and admit even infinite partially ordered sets of truth values, ranging from absolute truth to absolute falsity through a more or less densely populated spectrum of intermediate values (of course, not all many-valued logics lend themselves to such a reading, but most fuzzy logics-and especially Lukasiewicz's infinite-valued logic-do, and we shall not consider other logics in what follows).
Thus, a is more P than b is interpreted as: the truth value of a is P is greater than the truth value of b is P. An implication-like connective can be accordingly introduced: A -• B means that the truth value of A is smaller than or equal to the truth value of B. A -• B is absolutely true just in that case, and takes a smaller truth value otherwise.
Let us now review the principal objections raised against this kind of approach. Once again, some criticisms have a purely logical or epistemological character, whereas other ones focus more closely on comparatives. (Lakoff 1975) . One might find it rather unconvincing to have an infinite set of truth values, because human beings can only perceive finitely many distinctions among degrees. Lakoff, however, calls this a 'surface phenomenon*. (Kamp 1975; Williamson 1994) . All manyvalued logics generalize classical truth functionality to the new contexts 
A) Number of values
B) Generalized truth functionality
Comparative implication
Relevance logicians claim that implication is an inherently relational, non truth functional notion. We agree with the first claim and disagree with the second.
We think that it is truth functional because it involves a comparison between the degrees of truth of the antecedent and of the consequent We also suggest that it is inherently relational because such a comparison cannot be avoided even in extreme cases, such as whenever the antecedent is absolutely false or the consequent is absolutely true (A) Every proposition is semantically interpreted by a degree of truth. Truth degrees should form at least a partially ordered set; in the following, however, we further assume that they form a conditionally complete lattice.
(B)
A truth degree may he positive, in which case the proposition to which it is assigned is true, or it may be negative, in which case the proposition is fake. Negative degrees precede in the ordering positive degrees. No degree can be both positive and negative, but some of them can be neither-Le. there may exist intermediate truth degrees. In general, the lattice of truth degrees is not bounded. These are the most striking features which distinguish comparative logic from many-valued and fuzzy logics, whose sets of truth degrees usually contain just one positive degree (absolute truth) and just one negative degree (absolute falsity), as well as a more or less numerous stock of intermediate degrees. Ironically, fuzzy logicians do not really take fuzziness at face value. They only admit degrees of approximate truth, not however degrees of 'definite' truth; correspondingly, they only admit degrees of approximate membership in a set, but not degrees of definite membership (in spite of LakofFs quite persuasive remarks about 'degrees of birdiness' and the like). Indeed, it seems natural to say that if John is 2.10 m tall and Bill is 2.05 m tall, they both definitely belong to the set of tall men, but the first does so more frian the second.
(C) Although it may have no top element, the subset of positive truth degrees always has a bottom element; dually, the set of negative truth degrees always has a top element Such degrees correspond to the truth values of the truth (t), respectively falsity (f), constants. So, being true means having a truth degree that follows the degree of t, while being false means having a truth degree that precedes the degree of £ This appears plausible as there are propositions, such as a is at most as Pas a, which are certainly true, but in a way seem to be minimally so (for every b strictly Per than a, a is at most as P as b seems truer). A specular argument can be carried out for their negations.
(D) Negation (->) is conceived
1 of as an involution on die order of degrees. In particular, ->A is true iff A is false and false iff A is true.
(E) There are two kinds of disjunction and conjunction connectives, which we respectively dub lattice-theoretical (V and A) and group-theoretical (© and 0). Other substructural logics draw a similar distinction, although resorting to a different nomenclature-linear logicians prefer to talk about additive and multiplicative connectives, while relevance logicians use the pair
extensional-intensional We stipulate that the truth degree of A A B (A V B) is the greatest lower bound (least upper bound) of the truth degrees of A, B, so that, in particular, A A B (A V B) is true (false) iff both A and B are true (false), but may be false (true) without any of its members being false (true). The truth degree of A © B is the 'sum' (in a sense to be specified below) of the truth degrees of A, B, whereas A ® B is defined as ->(->A © -<B). In particular, A © B (A ® B) is true (false) iff each one of A and B is at most as false (true) as the other one is true (false). (F) Implication (<) is defined in terms of negation and group-theoretical disjunction: A < B is the same as -«A © B and is therefore true iff the truth degree of A is smaller than or equal to the truth degree of B, in accordance with (SA) above.
(G) Quantifiers (V and 3) are viewed as infinitary analogues of latticetheoretical conjunction and disjunction. Hence, they are interpreted by means of generalized greatest lower bounds, resp. least upper bounds, of bounded sets of truth degrees.
Advantages of the approach
The comparative-logical approach to comparatives solves, at least partially, many problems plaguing supervaluadonal, degree-semantical and fuzzy approaches to the issue. Let us examine them one by one. 
Comparative logic and the semantics of adjectives
Let us now return to an issue already debated at the outset; one could wonder whether the framework just described could be suitably adapted to deal with linguistical constructions other than comparatives-in primis, positive adjectives, common nouns, and intransitive verbs, Le. those grammatical categories that the old-fashioned tradition of logical analysis obstinately persisted in conflating within the single logical category of one-place predicates.
In our opinion, such an obstinacy has a point In fact it leads to a considerable simplification of our syntax: rather than being forced to introduce three classes of expressions, we could make do with just one. Of course, we should show that this option can be put into practice.
Given our ontology of truth degrees, one-place predicates are naturally interpreted by functions whose arguments are individuals of a specified domain, and whose values are degrees of truth: given the individual denoted by John, for instance, the function denoted by tall yields the degree to which John is tall. The class of one-place predicates can be trisected as following, leaving it open to debate whether common nouns and intransitive verbs should belong to the first or to the second subclass. Sharp non gradable predicates (four-legged, three years old, etc) are interpreted by functions whose range of values consists of just two degrees, a positive and a negative one, each one the opposite of the other. Sharp gradable predicates (acid, acute, etc) are interpreted by functions possibly assuming any positive or negative degree, though never an intermediate one. Finally, vague dimension predicates (tall, big, etc) correspond to functions having for a range the whole spectrum of truth degrees.
As we remarked in the first two sections, the main drawback of the predicative approach to adjectival semantics is the implausibility of a conjunctive reading of such sentences as (3) above. Suppose now to have, beside group-theoretical and lattice-theoretical conjunctions, a third, noncommutative, conjunction connective. Read A*B as 'A, taking into account that B'. Now a 'conjunctive* reading seems plausible: the semantical equivalence of (18) and (19) can be argued for with good reasons.
(18) Dumbo is a small elephant; (19) Dumbo is small, taking into account that Dumbo is an elephant
Some remarks about the issue of reference classes are now in order. Some occurrences of dimension adjectives have an explicitly attached reference class, in the form of a common noun; in such cases, it is obvious how to translate our natural language sentences to a sentence of the form A * B. In other cases, the appropriate reference class is implicit and must be supplied by the context, so our identification of the logical form of the sentence will proceed from, for example, JO/JM is tall to John is tall for a person, to John is tall, taking into account that John is a person. Where there is neither an explicit nor an implicit reference class, we take a is tall to mean something like a is tall by any (plausible) standard.
In our ontology of truth degrees such a connective has to be matched by a suitable noncommutative 'product'. This requires that we broaden our set of stipulations of section 4.3.
(H) We assume the existence of an associative product operation on truth degrees satisfying a restricted form of distribution over sum on both sides. Both hypotheses are mainly made for the sake of algebraic niceness and in order to prove some suitable restrictions of isotony principles, though being at least not too implausible from an intuitive standpoint (I) The product of two positive degrees is again a positive degree. For example, someone who is a child and is tall by any plausible standard is someone who is tall for a child.
(J) We have to guarantee a certain interplay between product and negation. For example, we must be able to conclude mat a non-small elephant is not a small elephant On the other hand, something which is not a small elephant is not necessarily a non-small elephant (it might be a tiger or whatever), but an elephant which is not a small elephant is certainly a non-small elephant (K) If a product of truth degrees is greater than or equal to zero, so is its second member. For example, from the fact that Dumbo is a small elephant we must be able to conclude that it is an elephant (L) 'Cancelling' a (strictly) positive degree on both sides of a disequality, the direction of the disequality is preserved. This expresses some invariance of relative rankings across different standards. For example, if John is a taller man than Bill, then John is taller than BilL Were we to accommodate value adjectives into our framework, we should probably drop this requirement Casari (1997) already attempted a 'three-level 1 expansion of comparative logic containing three sorts of conjunction and disjunction connectives: lattice-theoretical or 'static' (both commutative and idempotent), group-theoretical or 'concurrent' (commutative but not idempotent) and ring-theoretical or 'sequential' (neither commutative nor idempotent). The applications Casari had in mind concerned the fields of action logic and analogical reasoning. What we are suggesting is a similar, but not identical, extension of comparative logic
OUTLINE OF A FORMAL MODEL
Let us now try to give a formal clothing to the informal considerations developed so far. -prering is a structure R = (G, +, -, o, <, x) The class of predicates (PRED; metavariables P, Q,...) is inductively defined as follows: -basic predicate constants are 1 -place predicates; -if P is in DIM and Q is a n-place predicate, then APQ is a n + 1-place predicate; -if P is a n-place predicate and Q is a m-place predicate, then NP, ZP and TP are n-place predicates, IP and DP are n -1-place predicates, KPQ and CPQ are n + m-place predicates; -nothing else is a predicate.
Ontological notions
Terms:
The class of terms (TERM; metavariables t, t', t,, t 2 ,...) is inductively defined as follows: -individual variables and constants are terms; -nothing else is a term.
Formulas:
The class of formulas (FOR; metavariables A, B,...) is inductively defined as follows: -if P is a n-placc predicate and t,,... ,tn are terms, then Pt, tn is a formula; -t and f are formulas; -if A and B are formulas, then ->A, A < B, A © B, A<g>B, AVB, AAB, A*B are formulas; -if x is a variable and A is a formula, then 3xA and VxA are formulas; -nothing else is a formula.
Comparative logic has been axiomatized in the logical alphabet {"•"S <, ©, ®, V, A, t, f, V, 3} and shown to be complete wj.t complete /-pregroups (Casari 1997) . The present writer has given a cut-free Gentzen formulation of its purely group-theoretical fragment. Modifiers such as very, rather, etc are not easy to treat within our present framework. As regards very, however, there might be a cheap way out Following Wheeler's (1972) analysis of superlatives, a very tall man could be considered, for example, as someone who is tall for a tall man; hence, if H and M are predicate symbols standing for the properties of being tall and being a man, and j is a constant symbol denoting John, we could translate John is a very taU man as IIAHAHMj, whose meaning is We are not quite sure, however, that such a treatment wholly captures the real essence of very, much in the same way as we believe that our account of antonymy could prove to be unsatisfactory. 
Semantical notions
Examples
In Table 1 we formalize some natural language sentences frequently quoted in the literature on the subject Out of the several possible formalizations arising out of the interplay among combinators and connectives, we have chosen the ones that most closely mirror the superficial structure of the sentence.
In Table 2 we list some other frequently quoted sentences and inferences. The invalid ones are countersigned with a star, the weakly valid ones with a double star, the remaining ones are strongly valid. We leave it up to the reader to verify the correctness of the latter claim; we prove just a couple of examples. 
If Dumbo is a big elephant, then
LIMITATIONS OF THE MODEL AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS
We remarked earlier that the focus of the present paper would have been on general issues of adjectival semantics and on rather simple and standard forms of adjectival comparison, whereas more tricky issues such as, for example, those examined by von Stechow (1984) in his well-known survey of theories of comparison would have been left aside. We feel that our model, unless it were suitably refined, would prove seriously deficient if applied to problems of that sort None the less, these puzzles could provide effective stimuli to further improve our framework Von Stechow considers A) a group of examples related to comparatives in opaque contexts: Russell's ambiguity (23) , ambiguous counterfactuals (24), sentences with possibility operators (25) or with iterated modalities (26) .
At present, there is not much to say about A-C in the context of our modeL But, perhaps, some hints pointing to further developments can already be given.
A) As regards (23), we can in principle reproduce Russell's interpretation of the ambiguity, based on a scope distinction, in terms of degrees of truth (The degree of truth of The size that I thought your yacht was is large is greater than the degree of truth of The size that your yacht really is large'). In any case, all this presupposes a modalization of our modeL How could this be attained? Perhaps we should replace classical possible worlds, notoriously equivalent to valuations into the two-element Boolean algebra, with valuations into arbitrary /-pregroups. We do not know, right now, how fruitful such a line of thought could be.
B) An adequate model of comparatives should explain why (27) 
its logical form is (A < C) A (B < C). On the other hand, Konstanz is at least as nice as Dusseldorf or Stuttgart does not mean Konstanz is at least as nice as Dusseldorf or Konstanz is at least as nice as
Stuttgart, but, rather, Dusseldorf or Stuttgart (whichever is nicer) is at most as nice as Konstanz. Its logical form seems then A V B < C, which is comparative-logically equivalent to (A < C) A (B < C). This would seem to settle the matter. C) At present, our approach has very little to say on measure phrases and differential comparatives. It would seem as though we should at least endow our models with appropriate measure functions, in order to make some sense of expressions like 'A is twice as true as B' and the like. Still, it is hard to see how such sentences as (31) could be formalized.
Our model, moreover, is plagued by some more general inconveniences.
1) The fragment of English herewith analysed is extremely narrow: it does not even cover the whole class of relative adjectives (value adjectives and nonstandard adjectives such as fake, former, etc are left out of the picture), let alone other grammatical categories such as adverbs and the like. It has to be stressed that Montague grammar successfully deals with most such constructions. The proposirional view must then be considerably widened if it has to become a plausible alternative to the current approaches to the analysis of natural language.
2) The mathematical model calls for further refinement work, both from a purely algebraic standpoint (the study of/-prerings in themselves) and from the point of view of its intuitive adequacy, at present far less than satisfactory. Consider for instance the following phenomenon of 'opacity'. Let John be a 1.71 m tall American, and Jim a 1.70 m tall Pigmy. It would seem sensible to assign both John is an American and Jim is a Pigmy the same (positive) truth degree: Jim is no more and no less a Pigmy than John is an American. Moreover, John is tall is truer than/»m is tall. By restricted isotony, then, John is a tall American should be truer than Jim is a tall Pigmy, a disputable conclusion indeed. It seems, then, that sharp predicates which are used as reference classes cannot as a rule denote functions with the same range in the same model.
3) Our postulates on logical constants might seem rather artificial. Some readers could point out that any natural language construction can be roughly simulated by introducing a new connective, a corresponding algebraic operation, and some ad hoc postulates governing their behaviour. We concede such a criticism as regards our treatment of antonymy, partly concede it for relative adjectives, and definitely reject it as regards comparatives. A logic having a well-understood proof theory and a natural algebraic interpretation is not ad hoc. Comparative logic has both; its threelevel extension might turn out to have a sufficiently plausible algebraic counterpart; the logic of antonym adjectival pairs, unfortunately, has neither, at least so far.
In a sequel to the present paper we hope to tackle in a successful way some of the previously discussed difficulties.
